How IMF conditionality and investment treaties turned economic policy into permanent law

In the winter of 1991, a Harvard economist named Jeffrey Sachs arrived in Moscow as an adviser to Boris Yeltsin’s reform team, carrying a briefcase of policy recommendations. The Soviet Union was in its final weeks. Russia had a new government, a devastated economy, and no functioning legal infrastructure for private ownership. Prices were to be freed on 2 January 1992.

He called what he brought “shock therapy.” The name implied medicine: painful, temporary, necessary. What it actually contained was a legal architecture. And legal architectures do not expire.

The Briefcase

The recommendations Sachs carried were not improvised. They had been tested, first in Bolivia in 1985, then in Poland in 1989 and 1990. In both cases, Sachs advised governments to move fast: liberalize prices, privatize state enterprises, open capital accounts, cut subsidies. He argued that reform needed to move as fast as possible, not as ambition, but as architectural necessity. Slower movement would allow opposition to consolidate.

The speed was not incidental. It was structural. A government that privatized rapidly created facts on the ground before democratic deliberation could catch up. By the time parliaments understood what had been transferred, the transfers were complete.

In Russia, the transfers moved faster than anywhere before. Between 1992 and 1994, thousands of state enterprises were redistributed through a voucher program run by Anatoly Chubais, a system that most Russians did not understand and most could not use. What had been public infrastructure became private holdings, concentrated in the hands of a small number of men who became known as oligarchs. In 1995, under a loans-for-shares scheme proposed by the banker Vladimir Potanin and backed by Chubais, a handful of banks acquired controlling stakes in twelve of the country’s largest companies.

The Contract

Jeffrey Sachs resigned publicly as adviser in January 1994, days after Yegor Gaidar and Boris Fyodorov left the government. He later wrote that he had no role in the privatization projects. He later described his experience there as a failure, attributing it to insufficient Western financial support and to corruption within the Russian government. What he did not describe were the contracts.

Between 1992 and 1999, Russia signed a series of bilateral investment treaties with Western nations. These treaties were presented as protections for foreign investors, standard instruments of economic integration. What they actually created was a parallel legal system, one in which investment disputes could be adjudicated not by Russian courts but by international arbitration panels, outside Russian jurisdiction, under rules that Russian citizens had no vote in creating.

The architects of this system were not only Russian. The IMF attached conditionality requirements to its loans, requirements that included specific legal structures: private property protections, limits on renationalization, capital account liberalization. The World Bank followed similar frameworks. The legal infrastructure was not incidental to the financial assistance. It was the price of it.

By 1996, the reform years had produced a body of commitments, to lenders and to treaty partners, that would outlast the people who negotiated them. Those commitments were binding. Not through force, but through law.

Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who had acquired Yukos Oil through the loans-for-shares scheme in 1995, understood the architecture better than most. When Vladimir Putin moved against him in 2003, Yukos was broken up and its assets passed to the state. The company’s former majority shareholders then took Russia to arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty, which Russia had signed in 1994 and applied provisionally. In 2014, tribunals administered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague awarded them more than $50 billion, widely described as the largest arbitration award ever made.

A Hague district court set the award aside in 2016 on jurisdictional grounds. The Hague Court of Appeal reinstated it in 2020, and on 17 October 2025 the Dutch Supreme Court rejected Russia’s last challenges. The mechanism that produced it outlasted every appeal. The contracts were still running.

The Lock

International investment law operates on a principle called the Fair and Equitable Treatment standard. Under this standard, a government that changes regulatory conditions in ways that affect investor expectations can be held liable for those changes, even if the changes are democratically enacted.

This is not a hypothetical. By the end of 2014, UNCTAD counted 608 known investment treaty cases worldwide. Governments were sued over minimum wages (Veolia against Egypt, a claim Egypt won in 2018), over environmental regulations, and over reversing privatizations that had proven damaging. The cases were heard not in national courts but in bodies like the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, an institution housed inside the World Bank.

The people who sat on arbitration panels were drawn largely from a small network of international law firms. They rotated between representing claimants and serving as arbitrators. There was no appeal on the merits. Awards could be challenged only on narrow grounds, in annulment or set-aside proceedings, as the Yukos case itself shows.

A legal system with no appeal on the merits, staffed by rotating members of a small professional network, operating outside democratic oversight, adjudicating claims that constrain what elected governments can do: this is the architecture that shock therapy required to become permanent.

The lock was not metaphorical. It was procedural.

The Template

Russia was not the last country to receive this architecture. The same framework, adapted to local conditions, was applied across Eastern Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America through the 1990s and 2000s. Each application shared the same basic structure: rapid privatization, bilateral investment treaties, IMF conditionality, ISDS mechanisms.

The vocabulary shifted with each application. “Shock therapy” became “structural adjustment,” “structural adjustment” became “market liberalization”: each term describes a legal obligation in economic vocabulary. The underlying architecture did not change.

What changed was the sophistication of the delivery. By the time the same framework was applied to Ukraine’s agricultural land market in 2020, as a condition of a $5 billion IMF loan, the presentation was seamless. International financial integration. Modernization. Alignment with European standards.

The template had been refined over three decades. It no longer looked like a template.

The Absence

Jeffrey Sachs did not design the bilateral investment treaty system. He did not write the ISDS arbitration rules. He was an economic advisor, not a legal architect. This distinction is important.

It is also, in a precise sense, the mechanism.

The shock therapy framework created the conditions under which investment treaty law became necessary. Once privatization had occurred at speed, reversing it required compensating investors at market rates. Once capital accounts were open, closing them triggered treaty obligations. The economic recommendations and the legal architecture were not the same thing. But they required each other. One without the other would not have held.

Sachs later became a prominent critic of the Washington Consensus, of austerity, of the financial institutions whose frameworks he had helped implement. His criticism was genuine and often accurate. It did not engage the legal layer. It did not ask why the agreements signed during the reform period were still governing investment disputes thirty years later. It did not address what it means that a legal architecture installed in a few years of reform continues operating after the advisor who recommended it has changed his mind.

The contracts do not change their mind.

The law made it permanent. But the law was not the deepest layer.

The deepest layer was the assumption that legal permanence was not a political choice. That what was signed in 1992 simply was, the way mountains simply are. That the question of whether it should be revisited was not a legal question but an ideological one, and therefore not serious.

That is the architecture. Not the briefcase. Not the economist. The contracts that kept running after everyone involved had moved on to something else.

Related from The Manifest Archive